International Atomic Energy Agency

SENIOR REGULATORS' MEETING

25 September , 2014, Vienna

The IAEA Programme in Nuclear Security for Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities

Khammar Mrabit

Director, Division of Nuclear Security

Nuclear Security Plans

- Three Nuclear Security Plans (NSPs) completed, 2002-2005, 2006-2009, 2010-2013
- Current NSP 2014-2017 Underway
- Nuclear security is a national responsibility



IAEA
Atoms for Peace

Board of Governors
General Conference

GOV/2013/42-GC(57)/19
Date: 2 August 2013

General Distribution
Original: English

For official use only

Item 4(b) of the Board's provisional agenda
(GOV/2013/37)
Item 16 of the Conference's provisional agenda
(GC(57)/1, Add.1 and Add.2)

Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017

Report by the Director General

Summary

The first concerted nuclear security plan was approved in March 2002 by the Board of Governors (GOV/2002/10), which also approved the creation of a voluntary funding mechanism, the Nuclear Security Fund (NSF). The Board approved the current Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013 (GOV/2009/54) in September 2009. This Plan will be concluded at the end of 2013. The Agency convened the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Enhancing Global Efforts at the Agency's Headquarters from 1 to 5 July 2013. On 1 July, Ministers adopted a Declaration which, inter alia, urged the Agency to take account of the Declaration in finalizing its Nuclear Security Plan for 2014 to 2017. This Plan builds on General Conference resolutions, the Ministerial Declaration and, where appropriate, the conclusions and recommendations from the Conference. In addition, it consolidates activities set out in the Nuclear Security Plan 2010–2013, taking into account new and modified priorities of Member States.

Recommended Action

It is recommended that the Board of Governors:

a. Approve the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017;

b. Approve the continuation of voluntary funding for the activities included in the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017, without targets, and call upon all Member States to continue contributing on a voluntary basis to the Nuclear Security Fund; and

c. Transmit the Plan to the General Conference with a recommendation that the Conference takes note of the Nuclear Security Plan 2014–2017 and calls upon Member States to contribute to the Nuclear Security Fund.

Statement by DG IAEA

- We are active across the full spectrum of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In nuclear power, for example, we advise countries on how to put the appropriate legal and regulatory framework in place, and how to ensure the highest standards of safety, security and safeguards.

IAEA Perspectives on Future of Nuclear Energy

by Director General Yukiya Amano- 11 March 2013.

Scope

Nuclear Security of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities when material is:

In Use



Storage

Transport

These are regulated activities.

How to regulate with security perspective???

National Nuclear Security Regime

- Legislative and regulatory framework
- The institutions and organizations within the State responsible for implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework
- Nuclear Security Systems and Measures

  (Nuclear Security Fundamentals NSS -20)

Overview of NSNS' Activities and Structure



Nuclear Security of Materials and Facilities (MAFA) under Regulatory Control

- Nuclear Security of material and facilities:
  - under regulatory control
  - in use, storage and transport
  - in civilian use

- For protection against unauthorized removal and sabotage

- Implementation of rapid and comprehensive measures to locate and recover missing or stolen material OR mitigate and minimize radiological consequences.

Nuclear Security of Materials and Facilities (MAFA) under Regulatory Control (Cont'd)

The scope:

1. Objective and Essential Elements of a State's Nuclear Security Regime – NSS 20

2. Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities – NSS 13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev-5)

Thematic Areas - Nuclear Security of Regulated Facilities



Elements of the Programme

- Development of nuclear security guidance documents
- Practical implementation of IAEA guidance -improving security in Member States
- Development of security model exercises
- Establish CRPs on nuclear security
- Organize and hold international technical meetings, seminars and workshops
- Expert, assessment and advisory missions
- Capacity building
- Physical protection upgrades

Nuclear Security Series Categories



Existing Guidance

- NSS 13 (INFCIRC/225/Rev-5): Countries should license activities or issue authorizations only when the operator comply with physical protection requirements (3.12)
- NSS 13 is for the State, Regulator and the Operator on PP of nuclear material and nuclear facilities.
- Relevant Implementing Guides: NSS 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19
- Technical guides: NSS4

Current Areas of Work for Regulated Facilities and Activities

- Promoting Implementation of NSS 13- INFCIRC225/Rev-5 and Development of Implementing guides on " How to Implement NSS 13-225". (RTCs on the topic. NST 023 on protection of Nuclear material and facilities and NST 017 Security during transport)
- Threat Assessment and DBT (around 60 DBT WS based on NSS 10 delivered and International Conference on lessons learned from DBT workshops)
- Front end- Uranium industry (draft guidance and training material on security during extraction- 2 NTC and one RTC)
- NPPs (NSS 13. NST 023, NSS 4, Draft on Nuclear Security Regulatory Assessments for Licensing of NPPS)
- Research Reactors (draft TECHDOC on Nuclear Security Management for Operators)
- NMAC (TG and training courses)

Current Areas of Work for Regulated Facilities and Activities (Cont'd)

- Back end- Rad Waste and repatriation of HEU and spent fuel from RR
- Nuclear security culture (2 TG and exercises for self assessment, very advance training curricula)
- Security during transport (NSS 13. NST 017 on how to implement NSS 13 for security during transport and advance training courses, practical exercises etc)
- IPPAS Missions(62 missions, 7 workshops, 2 Regional WS and Seminars 2,)
- CRPs (NUSAM-Nuclear security assessment methodologies is on going - few in pipeline like security of research reactors, NMAC, Nuclear Security Culture and Security of Rad Sources)
- Capacity Building (Specialized training courses like protection against sabotage, Vulnerability Analysis, PP Inspections, PP system evaluations, DBTs, Protection against insiders, NMAC, Security during transport, Nuclear security culture , Train-the-trainers etc.
- Physical Protection Upgrades at RRs, NPPs, Radioactive Sources etc.
- Security of IAEA Facilities like Siebersdorf and LEU Bank

Challenges

- Sensitive information- no one want to share in the name of security
- No “one size fit all” formula applicable
- Protection techniques differ- technology vs manpower
- Different regulatory approaches
- A lot to do in short time

…Thank you for your attention

K.Mrabit@iaea.org